Building Defense Industrial Strength: The 8(a) Contribution

“American national power depends on a strong industrial sector capable of meeting both peacetime and wartime production demands.”
–President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy, page 4

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President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) is explicit that American power rests not only on our military forces, but on the strength and readiness of the industrial sector that supports them.

The NSS wisely defines industrial strength in operational terms: the ability to sustain production in peacetime and to surge rapidly under wartime conditions.

Under this framework, aggregate spending alone is not a sufficient measure of strength. A defense industrial base dominated by a small number of large contractors may appear strong by dollar value while remaining structurally fragile. True industrial strength depends on supplier depth, redundancy, and distributed production capacity across defense-relevant manufacturing, materials, electronics, engineering, sustainment, and logistics.

Using federal contracting data from fiscal years 2015 through 2024, this paper evaluates whether the structure of the current defense industrial base aligns with the requirements President Trump has set forth, and examines the role 8(a) firms play within that structure.

The issue is not program preservation as an end in itself, but whether eliminating an existing procurement mechanism would weaken the industrial characteristics the Trump NSS identifies as essential to American national power.

“That requires not only direct defense industrial production capacity but also defense-related production capacity.”
— National Security Strategy, President Donald J. Trump, November 2025, p. 4

Key Findings (FY2015–FY2024)
  1. 8(a) firms are consistently over-represented in the defense-industrial supplier base.
  2. This pattern is stable across time and shocks.
  3. 8(a) firms provide breadth, not dollar concentration.
  4. 8(a) defense-industrial obligations are significantly less concentrated than defense obligations overall, providing redundancy and bench depth.
  5. No single 8(a) firm dominates defense-industrial spending.
Metric Metric Defense Industrial Base (All Vendors) 8(a) Defense-Industrial Vendors Real-World Consequence
Share of active federal vendors - ~4–6% Baseline presence
Share of defense-industrial vendors 100% ~7–8% 8(a) firms are over-represented in defense-industrial participation
Vendor concentration ratio (defense vs all) 1.3–1.6 Structural over-representation, stable over time
Share of defense-industrial obligations 100% ~4–5% Modest dollar share consistent with tier-2 / tier-3 roles
Top 1 firm share (defense dollars) ~4–15% ~2–4% Lower single-point-of-failure risk
Top 10 firms’ share ~21–33% ~13–18% Broader distribution among 8(a) firms
Top 25 firms’ share ~34–45% ~25–30% Significantly less concentrated
Pattern stability (2015–2024) - Yes Holds across COVID and surge periods

Across every year examined, 8(a) participation increases supplier breadth while reducing dollar concentration. The 8(a) segment is consistently less concentrated than the defense industrial base overall, indicating a structural contribution to redundancy and resilience rather than dominance or dependency.

Conclusion

President Trump’s National Security Strategy makes clear that American national power depends on an industrial sector capable of sustaining peacetime production and surging rapidly in wartime. The data from FY2015–FY2024 show that 8(a) firms play a measurable role in delivering exactly those characteristics within defense-industrial sectors. They are consistently over-represented in the defense-industrial supplier base, broadly distributed across firms, and significantly less concentrated than defense contracting overall. This pattern reflects redundancy, depth, and reduced single-point-of-failure risk—core attributes of a resilient defense industrial base.


Methodology:

This analysis evaluates the structure of the U.S. defense industrial base using federal contracting data from fiscal years 2015–2024.

Because the federal government does not publish a single authoritative list of NAICS codes labeled “defense industrial base,” this analysis follows the approach used by federal agencies and oversight bodies: defining defense-industrial activity by capabilities rather than labels, and operationalizing those capabilities using standard industry classification systems.

Defense-industrial activity is identified by mapping NAICS codes to industries the federal government has repeatedly treated as defense-critical across Department of Defense industrial base assessments, Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security surveys conducted under the Defense Production Act, and GAO and Congressional Research Service evaluations. These sources consistently describe the defense industrial base as a layered system that includes not only final-assembly weapons production, but also defense-related manufacturing, electronics, materials, engineering, sustainment, and logistics capacity necessary for readiness and surge.

For empirical analysis, NAICS codes are grouped into five categories:

  1. core defense manufacturing;
  2. defense electronics and sensors;
  3. defense-critical industrial inputs;
  4. defense engineering, research, and technical services; and
  5. defense logistics, maintenance, and sustainment.

To preserve analytical discipline, the framework excludes activities that do not map directly to defense production or sustainment, including general civil construction, disaster recovery and FEMA-centric rebuilding, civil infrastructure without a defense role, and local public-works services.

Vendor participation is measured using unique recipient entity identifiers (recipient UEI). Activity threshold of $2,000 is applied to ensure the measurement of meaningful participation in federal work, and obligations are floored at zero to avoid distortions from administrative deobligations. The analysis focuses on supplier participation, concentration, and relative representation rather than program utilization rates.

This methodology does not assume that all firms within these industries perform defense work exclusively, nor that all defense work occurs within them. It provides a consistent, government-aligned framework for evaluating whether the structure of the defense industrial base aligns with the requirements articulated in President Trump’s NSS.

Defense Manufacturing NAICS (Final List)
Aerospace, Missiles, and Vehicles
Shipbuilding and Heavy Transport
Weapons and Munitions
Precision Manufacturing
Electronics, Sensors, and Communications
Manufacturing
Power, Control, and Energy Systems
DIB = Defense Industrial Base
Tier 1 — Core Defense Manufacturing & Weapons
Tier 2 — Defense Electronics, Sensors, and Precision Equipment
Tier 3 — Upstream Materials & Industrial Inputs
Tier 4 — Engineering, R&D, and Technical Services
Tier 5 — Sustainment, Repair, and Logistics Support